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AGENCY LAW-EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES-The

agency who fails to take the statutory appeal provided by the Local

Agency Law is precluded from contesting the merits of the agency's
order at a subsequent enforcement proceeding.

Erie Human Relations Commission ex rel. Dunson v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 348 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1975).
Four days after being discharged from his position with the Erie

Insurance Exchange (Exchange), Sanford Dunson, a black man,
registered a complaint with the Erie Human Relations Commission
(Commission)' alleging unlawful racial discrimination in his discharge.2 The Commission, after an investigation and two informal

hearings at which all parties were present, found the firing to have

been racially motivated and ordered 3 Dunson's reinstatement. The
Exchange declined to do so, whereupon the Commission scheduled
the matter for a formal hearing.' At the conclusion of the hearing
the Commission issued findings of fact and an opinion 5 reaffirming
1. The Commission was established by the Erie Human Relations Commission Ordinance
(EHRCO), ERIE, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES 19-1963, art. 151, §§ 1-13 (1968). The text of this
ordinance appears in Brief for Appellant at 22a-43a, Erie Human Relations Comm'n ex rel.
Dunson v, Erie Ins. Exch., 348 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
2. Erie Human Relations Comm'n ex rel. Dunson v. Erie Ins. Exch., 348 A.2d 742, 743
(Pa. 1975). The EHRCO makes it an unlawful practice for any employer to discharge an
employee because of his race if the individual is best able and most competent to perform
the services required. The Ordinance also gives the Commission the power to receive and
investigate such complaints. ERIE, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES 19-1963, art. 151, §§ 6(a), 7(b)
(1968).
3. The chancellor in the court of common pleas thought this immediate issuance of an
order to be an improper approach under the provisions of the EHRCO. He detected an
absence of the "conference, conciliation and persuasion" which the state supreme court in
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 175, 233 A.2d
290, 299 (1967), held to be an element of the similarly worded Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (1964). He also noted that under the EHRCO, orders
are to be issued following formal hearings, not after informal investigatory proceedings. Erie
Human Relations Comm'n ex rel. Dunson v. Erie Ins. Exch., Civil No. 73 (C.P. Erie Co.,
February 20, 1973). This unreported opinion appears in Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at
44a-50a.
4. The Commission is empowered to proceed with a formal hearing in the event it fails to
eliminate the discriminatory practices by its informal methods. ERIE, PA., CODIFIED
ORDINANCES 19-1963, art. 151, § 8 (1968).
5. All testimony at the formal hearing is to be transcribed and given under oath. The
Commission is to then issue findings of fact based upon all evidence received at the hearing
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its earlier conclusion, and again ordered the Exchange to reinstate
DunsonA The Exchange made no effort to comply with the Commission's order, nor did it appeal the Commission's findings and conclusion.
A suit was filed on behalf of the Commission in the Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County seeking a mandatory injunction to
force compliance with the order.7 At this enforcement proceeding
the Exchange filed preliminary objections asserting that the complaint failed to allege sufficient grounds upon which to base a finding of racial discrimination, and that the findings of fact supporting
the complaint did not adequately identify the reason for the discharge. 8 The court of common pleas upheld the Exchange's objections and dismissed the suit
The Commission appealed from that decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania." ° During oral argument the commonwealth court injected sua sponte the issue of the relevance of the
Local Agency Law (LAL)" which had been enacted to implement
and order the offending party to take such steps as the Commission thinks necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Ordinance. Id.
6. The notice received by the Exchange also included a description of the enforcement
procedure available to the Commission. The EHRCO provides for certification of the record
and the case to the City Solicitor who shall seek enforcement of the order against any person
who fails to comply within ten days. Fines of up to $100.00 per violation may be imposed on
any person who fails, refuses or neglects to obey the order within the period allowed. Id. §§
10(a), 11.
7. See note 6 supra.
8. 348 A.2d at 743. The Exchange claimed that the pleadings did no more than state the
legal conclusion, without factual support, that it had been guilty of racial discrimination.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 21a. The complaint consisted mainly of the procedural
record of the case from the time of Dunson's dismissal until the time suit was filed. Id. at
3a-6a.
9. Erie Human Relations Comm'n ex rel. Dunson v. Erie Ins. Exch., Civil No. 73 (C.P.
Erie Co., February 20, 1973). The chancellor concluded that in order to violate the terms of
the EHRCO it was necessary to show that the person fired had been "best able and most
competent to perform the services required" and that the person's race had been the sole
cause of the firing. ERIE, PA., CODIFIED ORDINANCES 19-1963, art. 151, §§ 6(a), 4(g) (1968).
While he conceded that the findings of the Commission might have shown that racial prejudice was a factor in Dunson's dismissal, they failed to include facts tending to prove racial
discrimination as defined by the EHRCO.
10. See Erie Human Relations Comm'n ex rel. Dunson v. Erie Ins. Exch., 12 Pa. Commw.
267, 315 A.2d 663 (1974).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11301-11 (1972). The Local Agency Law (LAL) provides in
pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by a final adjudication who has a direct interest in such
adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom. Such appeal, unless otherwise
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article V, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." The court
determined that the Local Agency Law was applicable 3 and required a party aggrieved by the action of a local agency to perfect
an appeal to the appropriate court of common pleas within thirty
days; a failure to take this appeal precluded the aggrieved party
from contesting the merits of the agency decision at a later enforcement proceeding. 4 Since the Exchange failed to take such an appeal
it was foreclosed from now challenging the agency ruling.
As a result of this adverse decision, the Exchange requested, and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted, allocatur. On appeal, the
Exchange argued that the commonwealth court's reading of the
LAL was erroneous. Noting that the Commission's organic statute
was silent concerning appeals from its decisions, the Exchange contended that two methods of attacking the Commission's orders were
available to aggrieved parties. They could challenge the merits at
an enforcement proceeding, the method allowed prior to the enactment of the Local Agency Law,"' or they could appeal directly to the
provided by a statute authorizing a particular appeal, shall be taken within thirty days
to the court of common pleas of any judicial district in which the local agency has
jurisdiction.
Id. § 11307.
12, PA. CONST. art. V, § 9 was added to the constitution in 1968. It reads as follows:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of
record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an
administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such
court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may
be provided by law.
This new section was not self-executing. Section 7 of the LAL was enacted to provide the right
to an appeal which article V sought to confer. See note 11 supra.
13. 12 Pa. Commw. at 271-72, 315 A.2d at 665. /The LAL states that the term "local
agency
means any department, departmental board or commission, independent administrative board or commission, office or other agency of a political subdivision now in
existence or hereafter created, empowered to determine or affect private rights, privileges, immunities or obligations by adjudication ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11302(2) (1972).
14. 12 Pa. Commw. at 272, 315 A.2d at 665.
15, In Philadelphia v. Price, 419 Pa. 564, 215 A.2d 661 (1966), the court held that while
the absence of an appeal provision in a local agency's organic statute would preclude any
recourse to the courts for direct judicial review, it would not preclude a challenge to the
validity of the agency order at an enforcement proceeding. 419 Pa. at 568-70, 215 A.2d at 66364. Since the Commission's enabling legislation, like the ordinance in Price, was silent as to
appeals, the Exchange reasoned that it likewise had the right to attack the Commission's
order at an enforcement proceeding. The Exchange's reliance on Price, however, was rejected
in Erie. See text accompanying notes 19-20 infra.
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court of common pleas as provided by the LAL. 6 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did not agree. Speaking for the majority, Justice
Eagen first noted that the LAL was enacted to provide a "uniform
and comprehensive method of appeal" from agency decisions where
none had previously existed. 7 In addition, this new procedure had
to be considered in light of the "well settled" policy in Pennsylvania
that statutory remedies were to be strictly pursued to the exclusion
of other available remedies." The court found misplaced the Exchange's reliance on Philadelphiav. Price,'9 where a defendant who
failed to comply with an order issued by the Philadelphia Human
Relations Commission was allowed to attack the merits of that order
at an enforcement proceeding. Since that case predated both the
constitutional amendment and the passage of the LAL, Price was
not controlling. 0 The court concluded that the appeal provisions of
the LAL had to be viewed as substitutional rather than supplemental. The right to a statutorily provided, direct appeal from an agency
adjudication would preclude an aggrieved party from challenging
the merits of an agency order at a proceeding brought to enforce it.21
Finally, the court disposed of the Exchange's argument that the
supremacy clause in the state Human Relations Act"2 required that
a party aggrieved by the action of a local human relations commis16. See note 11 supra.
17. 348 A.2d at 744.
18. Id. Justice Eagen cited Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
417 Pa. 168, 208 A.2d 780 (1965), as authority for this proposition. Pennsylvania Life Ins.
concerned a decision by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department (PID) that the defendant's
use of its proposed name would not be an unfair trade practice since it was not deceptively
similar to the plaintiff's name. The PD was specifically covered by the state Administrative
Agency Law (AAL), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-51 (1962), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 211.403 (1970), which provided for a comprehensive right of appeal from state agency
decisions. The aggrieved plaintiff failed to perfect his appeal under the AAL, but instead filed
suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from using its proposed name. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the lower court properly dismissed the suit since the plaintiff had
an adequate remedy at law in his right to appeal. The plaintiff was not free to ignore his
statutory remedy and invoke an equitable one. 417 Pa. at 173-74, 208 A.2d at 783.
19. 419 Pa. 564, 215 A.2d 661 (1966) (white seller ordered by Philadelphia Human Relations Commission to sell home to Chinese buyer).
20. 348 A.2d at 745.
21. Id. at 744.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1976). The supremacy
clause of the state Act provides in part:
In the event of a conflict between the interpretation of a provision of this act and
the interpretation of a similar provision contained in any municipal ordinance, the
interpretation of the provision in this act shall apply to such municipal ordinance.
Id. § 962(b).
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sion be given the same right as a party aggrieved by an order of the
state Human Relations Commission-an opportunity to challenge
the order at an enforcement proceeding. 3 Justice Eagen determined
that the supremacy clause of the state Human Relations Act could
only be triggered by a difference of interpretation between the state
Act and a local ordinance. 4 The clause did not require parity of
enforcement procedures contained in the two laws, but only that
similar substantive provisions be interpreted in accordance with the
Commonwealth's Act. The court concluded that the variations in
the enforcement provisions of the state Act and the Erie Human
Relations Commission Ordinance (EHRCO) amounted to a clear
difference rather than a problem of interpretation, hence no supremacy question was presented.? Justice Roberts, the lone dissenter, took issue with this part of the majority opinion.2 6 He felt that
the court's definition of conflict of interpretation was too narrow. He
approached the question from the standpoint of the different opportunities the two laws afforded parties seeking to challenge an agency
order, rather than the ambiguities in statutory language. Justice
Roberts was convinced that if the EHRCO purported to deny an
aggrieved party the right to contest the merits of an agency order
at an enforcement proceeding while the state Act allowed such a
challenge, the Commonwealth's Act would take precedence and the
Exchange's challenge would have to be allowed.?
The principal issue presented by Erie was whether the appeal
provisions of the Local Agency Law should be deemed the exclusive
method of challenging an agency order. Previous to the enactment
23. The Exchange argued that courts asked to enforce Commission orders were apparently
limited to the issue of enforcement vel non since the EHRCO conferred no greater power on
those courts. Conversely, courts enforcing state Human Relations Commission orders had the
power to enforce, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any orders of that agency. See id. §
960. In the Exchange's view, this indicated that courts called upon to enforce orders of the
state commission would have the power to allow challenges to the validity of state commission
orders despite the appeal available under the AAL. If an opposite conclusion was reached with
regard to courts dealing with the EHRCO, then that result would require the application of
the supremacy clause to align the local procedure with that of the state Act. In finding no
conflict between the state Act and the EHRCO, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left open
the question of whether the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act permitted challenges to the
merits of a state Commission adjudication in the enforcement proceeding brought to force
compliance with the order. 348 A.2d at 745.
24. 348 A.2d at 745.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 746 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
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of the LAL, a party aggrieved by the adjudication of a local agency
had a right to direct pre-enforcement review only if that right was
granted in the agency's organic statute.28 All other review was obtained collaterally, either by failing to comply with the agency order
and defending against it at the enforcement proceeding, as in Price,
or, by suing for injunctive relief in appropriate circumstances. 2 The
Local Agency Law, however, conferred the right to a direct appeal
to all parties having a direct interest in the adjudication of a local
agency.30 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's determination that
the LAL provided a remedy wholly displacing, rather than augmenting, the right to challenge local agency orders at enforcement
proceedings is clear; however, the reasons for that decision are not
as easily discernible.
Erie involved a party in an equity suit who had failed to take an
available appeal from the adjudication of an administrative agency;
its factual setting could lead to an inference that either the doctrine
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies 31 or the doctrine of
equitable restraint 32 could provide an adequate basis for the court's
decision. However, a conclusion that either of the two doctrines
supports the decision is unfounded. The exhaustion rule requires
that a party aggrieved by the action of an administrative agency
pursue all available procedures for obtaining review or redress
within the agency before he challenges the order in court.33 In Erie
there were no further administrative procedures for the Exchange
28. See Philadelphia v. Price, 419 Pa. 564, 568, 215 A.2d 661, 663 (1966).
29. An aggrieved party seeking injunctive relief must show that the order of the agency is
final, that the harm caused will be irreparable, and that no adequate legal remedy is available
to him. If it is possible that the order or regulation of the agency will not be enforced as stated,
injunctive relief will be denied until such time as its consequences become certain. See, e.g.,
Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (pre-enforcement injunction granted against
FDA regulation).
30. See note 11 supra.
31. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) (reviewing the purposes and rationale of the exhaustion doctrine). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20
(1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
ch. 11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
32. See generally J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 176 (5th ed. 1941).
33. The exhaustion doctrine has been explained as being grounded in principles of separation of powers and deters courts from interfering with decisions of other governmental
branches until all contemplated action has been completed. It also finds its roots in the
finality doctrine; as long as a possibility exists that an agency will give the desired relief to
the aggrieved party, no definite harm has resulted and there is nothing for the court to
adjudicate. See JAFFE, supra note 31, at 424-25.
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to pursue. The EHRCO did not provide for rehearings, nor did it
create a higher administrative body with the power to review orders
of the Commission. Since the Exchange did not fail to pursue any
administrative recourse available to it, the exhaustion rule could
not have been applied in these circumstances.
The doctrine of equitable restraint also fails to explain the result
in Erie. The doctrine requires that a party seeking to invoke the aid
of a court of equity must first pursue all adequate legal remedies
available to him. 34 An application of the doctrine results in the court
refusing to hear the suit at the outset; the court is concerned with
the legal remedies available to the plaintiff who is seeking to have
the court act, not with the defendant who seeks to prevent the court
from acting. 35 Therefore, the fact that the Exchange had an adequate legal remedy was of no consequence under this doctrine
because it was not the party invoking the aid of the court.
In Erie, the court did state that its decision was based on the
"well settled" rule that when statutory remedies are provided, the
procedure prescribed by the statute must be strictly pursued to the
exclusion of other means of redress. 3 This rule enunciated by the
court finds its origin in the Act of March 21, 1806,'3 which has been
the basis for Pennsylvania's policy that multiple remedies shall be
avoided, wherever possible, by demanding exclusivity of any available statutory remedy. 38 In contrast to the facts in Erie, however,
34. See, e.g., Knup v. Philadelphia, 386 Pa. 350, 126 A.2d 399 (1956) (injunction will not
issue where plaintiff failed to appeal zoning revision to Zoning Board of Adjustment); Kane
v. Morrison, 352 Pa. 611, 44 A.2d 53 (1945) (failure to challenge election petitions in court of
common pleas, as provided by law, precludes issuance of injunction to halt printing of ballots).
35. Equity cases where a defendant has been penalized for not having availed himself of
an earlier appeal are usually based on grounds other than this principle of equity. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Lentz, 353 Pa. 98, 44 A.2d 291 (1945) (failure to perfect appeal to court
which was expressly given exclusive jurisdiction); Bartron v. Northhampton, 342 Pa. 163, 19
A.2d 263 (1941) (agency ruling may not be challenged in a court other than the one expressly
given exclusive jurisdiction); Philadelphia v. Sam Bobman Dep't Store Co., 189 Pa. Super.
72, 149 A.2d 518 (1959) (failure to exhaust appeal procedures within agency).
36. 348 A.2d at 744.
37. Act of March 21, 1806, ch. 2686, §§ 1-14, [1806] Laws of Pa. 326, providing in part:
[Ifn all cases where a remedy is provided, or a duty enjoined, or anything directed to
be done by any act or acts of Assembly of this commonwealth, the directions of the
said acts, shall be strictly pursued, and no penalty shall be inflicted or any thing done
agreeably to the provisions of the common law, in such cases, further than shall be
necessary for carrying such act or acts into effect.
Id. § 13 (now codified at PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1504 (Supp. 1976)).
38. See O'Neill v. Lawrence, 43 Dauph. 121, 127, 27 Pa. D. & C. 441, 448 (C.P. 1936),
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the Act traditionally had been invoked by the Pennsylvania courts
in cases where the exhaustion doctrine could have been applied, and
in cases where courts of equity would have normally denied relief
based on considerations of equitable restraint. 31 Although the statute was never mentioned in the Erie opinion, it was instrumental
in every case cited by the court as authority for its conclusion that
the LAL provisions provided the exclusive avenue of redress available to parties aggrieved by local agency action. 0 Moreover, the
cases cited by the court involved circumstances where the Act was
applied to deny relief to plaintiffs, whereas Erie involved a defendant being sued to force compliance with an allegedly erroneous
order. Since the court's cited authority did not provide a precedent
for applying the rule of the Act to defendants, possibly the court was
persuaded that the sweeping language in those cases warranted an
application of the rule to the facts in Erie.4 Yet in federal cases the
where the court recognized: "It is not the policy of our law to multiply remedies." The cases
cited in Erie contain passages of similar tenor. See, e.g., Ermine v. Frankel, 322 Pa. 70, 72,
185 A. 269, 270 (1936) ("[w]here a remedy or method of procedure is provided . . . such
remedy or procedure is exclusive"); White v. Old York Road Country Club, 318 Pa. 346, 34950, 178 A. 3, 5 (1935) ("a statutory remedy must be followed to the exclusion of other common
law remedies").
39. E.g., Blank v. Board of Adjustment, 390 Pa. 636, 136 A.2d 695 (1957) (failure to appeal
issuance of variance to court of common pleas, as provided by law, precluded plaintiff from
obtaining injunctive relief); Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Forward Township School Dist., 366 Pa.
489, 78 A.2d 253 (1951) (taxpayer who failed to appeal initial assessment precluded from suing
in equity to recover money paid under unconstitutionally imposed tax); Vogt v. Port Vue
Borough, 170 Pa. Super. 526, 85 A.2d 688 (1952) (suit to enjoin borough manager from
revoking building permit improper where plaintiff failed to perfect statutory appeal to zoning
review board).
40. See note 41 infra.
41. The Erie court stated:
Moreover, it is well settled that "where statutory remedies are provided, the procedure
prescribed by the statute must be strictly pursued, to the exclusion of other methods
of redress . . . . This is particularly true of special statutory appealsfrom the action
of administrative bodies."
348 A.2d at 744 (emphasis in original). The quote was taken from Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy
v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775 (1938), a case involving a totally different
question than was present in Erie. Colteryahn held that parties who failed to introduce
relevant evidence at price hearings before the Milk Board were precluded from introducing
the evidence on appeal. The proposition taken from Colteryahn was based on three cases
involving parties aggrieved by agency action who sought injunctive relief while ignoring their
available remedy at law. Each of the cases, therefore, was distinguishable from Erie. See
Ermine v. Frankel, 322 Pa. 70, 185 A. 269 (1936) (suit for mandamus to compel board of
elections to change plaintiff's party registration improper when statutory appeal not taken);
White v. Old York Road Country Club, 318 Pa. 346, 178 A. 3 (1935) (suit to enjoin construction of gas station improper where plaintiff failed to perfect statutory appeal to court of
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difference between the positions of the moving party and the party
who must defend against the suit has been perceived as significant
enough to justify holding that even a failure to exhaust administrative remedies would not necessarily preclude a defendant from raising all possible defenses at an enforcement proceeding.42 Since Erie
was a case of first impression, it is troublesome that the court overlooked not only this contrary federal precedent, but also the significant distinction between Erie and those cases used as authority for
the decision.
The court's holding that the appeal provisions of the LAL are to
constitute the exclusive procedure for challenging the order of a
local agency was not an inevitable one. There is nothing in the
language of the Local Agency Law indicating that its appeal provisions were intended to be in lieu of a party's right to defend his
position at an enforcement proceeding. 3 Neither is there any apparent legislative or administrative purpose involved which would require such a conclusion." Federal courts called upon to determine
common pleas); Taylor v. Moore, 303 Pa. 469, 154 A. 799 (1931) (suit for mandamus to compel
issuance of building permit improper where plaintiff failed to appeal refusal to court of
common pleas as provided by law).
42. For example, in United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1952), the court
decided that a landlord's failure to appeal a rent regulation to the agency review board did
not bar a challenge to the validity of the regulation at the enforcement proceeding. The court
observed
[tihe discretionary rule adopted by courts of equity to the effect that a petitioner
will be denied equitable relief where he has failed to pursue an administrative remedy
under which he might obtain the same relief, is wholly misapplied when invoked
against a landlord who is not seeking equitable relief but is merely defending himself
against an enforcement action.
Id. at 885.
43. The LAL simply states that parties such as the Exchange "shall have the right to
appeal" and then prescribes the procedure for exercising that right. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
11307 (1972).
44. Some of the factors suggested as indicative of a need for an exclusive appeal procedure
include: (1) necessity for finality and regularity of interpretation; (2) need to prevent a
multiplicity of suits; and (3) complexity of the subject matter. See Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 429-33 (1944). None of these considerations appear to be applicable in Erie. The
first factor generally arises when an agency designed to deal with an emergency is involved
since it is essential for the agency to quickly establish a uniform and unquestioned body of
law in order to accomplish its goal. There is nothing to indicate that local agencies in general,
or the Commission in particular, were created to respond to such an emergency, or that the
Commission would be any less effective if made to proceed without a provision for exclusive
appeals. The second factor was apparently not significant in Erie because the decision does
not decrease the number of suits which will be brought. See note 49 and accompanying text
infra. It is difficult to understand how the third factor could be applied in Erie. The courts
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whether a specified appeal procedure should constitute the
exclusive recourse available to persons affected have generally
found exclusivity only when the statutory language or agency purpose required it.15 Furthermore, violation of an agency order, like
violation of a statute, has always been an acceptable method of
challenging its validity;" by holding that the merits of an administrative order may be challenged only by perfecting an appeal under
the LAL, Erie effectively eliminates resort to this alternative procedure. Erie also increases the possibility that an agency order will be
enforced without having its merits subjected to judicial scrutiny.
Such a result is generally regarded as an undesirable abdication of
the judiciary's authority to oversee the acts of administrative agencies. 7 Finally, the decision in Erie was not necessary in order to
promote judicial economy. While Erie will guarantee that an agency
order's validity will be litigated only once, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel" was available before this case to accomplish the same
end."
of common pleas are the forums for appeal both under the LAL and for the enforcement
proceedings under the EHRCO; they have no greater expertise when they sit as a court of
law than when they sit in equity.
45. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Yakus dealt with the provisions
of the Emergency Price Control Act which stated that price regulations enacted by the Office
of Price Administration (OPA) could only be judicially reviewed by a specially created Emergency Court of Appeals and then by the Supreme Court. In holding that this precluded a
defendant from challenging the validity of a price regulation at a criminal proceeding, the
Supreme Court noted that Congress had clearly expressed an intent to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on the new court. According to the Court, not only was the statutory language
unmistakably straightforward, but also a centralized and exclusive route of appeal was necessary in order for the OPA to adequately cope with the inevitable threat of wartime inflation.
Finality of price regulations and regularity of judicial interpretation were essential to the
accomplishment of the congressional purpose. The decision in Yakus was subsequently explained as having "resulted by prescription of the statute, rather than by application of the
accepted rule in courts of equity that equitable relief would be denied to a petitioner who
had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies." Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d
377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952) (defendant allowed to challenge the validity of rent regulations under
the rent control act which did not contain provision for the exclusive appeal found in the
Emergency Price Control Act).
46. See, e.g., DAvis, supra note 31, at § 23.07.
47. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (reviewing the nature of the judicial duty to supervise agency
action). See generally JAFFE, supra note 31, at 589-90.
48. See generally M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 207-12 (1972).
49. In the event an appeal was taken to the court of common pleas challenging the validity
of an order, the decision of that court could be pleaded by the successful party to estop the
unsuccessful party from relitigating the issue at a later enforcement proceeding. If no appeal
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Erie now makes it imperative that parties who are aggrieved by
the order of a local agency, and who wish to obtain judicial review
of that order, file an appeal in the court of common pleas within
thirty days. Should they fail to appeal, they face the prospect of
being forced to comply with an arguably invalid order without having had an opportunity to raise that invalidity as a defense. The
only issues left to be resolved when a local agency seeks to have its
unappealed order enforced involve the defendant's reasons for having failed to comply." Erie has thus elevated the adjudications of
local agencies to the same level as trial court proceedings: unless
appealed, the determinations in each are to be accepted as correct.
The basis for this increased confidence in the ability of local agencies to perform their quasi-judicial function with limited opportunity for review by a court remains unexplained.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Erie is the irony involved in
its result. The supreme court was faced with a piece of legislation
ostensibly enacted to increase an aggrieved party's ability to obtain
judicial review of an agency order; yet, the court construed the Local
Agency Law to increase the possibility that an agency order will be
enforced without effective judicial review of its merits. Whether
Erie's construction of the LAL is satisfactory to those who enacted
the law is unknown, but it seems unlikely that the court's reliance
on the policy behind the Act of March 21, 1806 could have been
anticipated by the legislature when it passed the LAL. If the Local
Agency Law was indeed enacted to provide aggrieved parties expanded opportunities to challenge agency action, Erie will require
the General Assembly to return to that law and express its purpose
in more explicit terms.
David B. Adams
was taken, the issue of the order's validity would be the subject of litigation for the first time
at the enforcement proceeding. In either case, the validity of the order would only be litigated
once.
50. See 12 Pa. Commw. at 272, 315 A.2d at 665.

